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1. I n t r o d u c t io n
With the end of the Cold War there was a widely shared view amongst scholars in 
Europe as well as in the USA to the effect that the victory of western style democracies 
was overwhelming and lasting. However, developments in the Balkan region in the last 
decade of the twentieth century tragically showed the significance of such an illusion. 
The question of capabilities came on the scene with the NATO bombing of Serbia in the 
Kosovo conflict. Over ninety-five percent of the bombs fired were from planes of the 
Unites States.1 Once again Europeans were unable to deal with conflicts on their territory. 
This time it was even worse. The European Union was depicted as not only a political but 
also a military dwarf.
The launching of the European Security and Defence Policy project in 1998 was a 
step towards independent European forces being able to cope with low-intensity conflicts 
without the help of the US. But European soldiers need weapons which are designed to 
combat the military challenges of the 21st century. This is hard to achieve in a situation 
where almost all European defence budgets are steadily decreasing. It is clear that 
European taxpayers are simply not prepared to pay the costs of their security.
At this point, defence ministers had to count with less support which required 
more effective use of scarce resources. Pooling of financial means, deeper harmonization 
of military requirements and technologies and a more competitive defence industry sector 
in Europe -  these were benefits which convinced European leaders to do something about 
transnational armaments cooperation in Europe. Up to the establishment of the European
1 Sloan, Elinor; DCI: Responding to the US-led Revolution in Military Affairs in: NATO Review, Vol. 48 - 
No. 1, Spring - Summer 2000, pp. 4-7
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Defence Agency under the flag of the European Union in summer 2004, member states 
had been reluctant to give up even a small part of their sovereignty to the international 
organization in sensitive policy areas such as defence armaments.
My core effort was to find an answer to the question: “ What logic and arguments 
stood behind the decision to go farther in the integration process o f  the EU  towards a 
common armaments policy via establishing the European Defence Agency?”. In order to 
answer this question, a broad analysis of the defence industry sector, pros and cons of the 
earlier cooperation projects and various defence market activities of the EU institutions 
are required. Arms export, defence research and technologies, disarmament, individual 
defence collaborative programmes and public scrutiny were issues that laid on the 
outskirts of the core subject. Therefore, they were mentioned in references to other 
themes.
I argue that the member states of the EU had been forced to leave the concepts of 
full defence autarky in the time of the interdependent global politics. Secondly, the 
pressure of the rapidly globalizing defence market, traditionally owned by the national 
governments, and the revolution in military affairs in the post-bipolar period had 
shattered with the competitiveness and effectiveness of the biggest European arms 
producing countries. It was not by the accident that heads of states and governments 
decided to unblock European armaments and give it an institutional foundation at the 
time while the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty and overall gravitation of the 
political integration in Europe was at stake.
As regards a timeline, this paper covers the armament cooperation at various 
institutional settings in the course of the 90s up to the establishment of the EDA and its
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first year of functioning. Based on the findings, there is an attempt to make a projection 
of the analyzed processes to see the major implications for the near future in the 
armaments sector.
Institutional framework of security organizations where European states are 
involved, such as NATO, OSCE, OSN or WEU were seen as a separate matter which was 
described and analyzed only with a relevance to the core of the study -  armaments in the 
framework of EU activities.
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1.1 T h e o r e t ic a l  F r a m e w o r k  -  E x p l a in in g  t h e  s u b je c t
The very nature of the armaments sector is complex. Even though, armament 
policy falls within the responsibilities of member states, its development and 
implementation is driven by many players. Therefore the question of actors in the game is 
crucial for any theoretical analysis o f this subject. The selection of the proper method can 
help to overcome structural problems.
The author of the study has chosen a liberal intergovernmental perspective which 
represents the broad family of liberal approaches to the theory of international relations. 
It recognizes the importance of member states realizing their national interests.2 
According to the liberal intergovernmentalists, a state-centred view is justified by the 
logic of the interior national politics which orientate governments’ decisions. A European 
layer enables them to come up with solutions which would be impossible at the national 
level. In fact, it multiplies the importance of national politics rather than weakens it.
Secondly, a multi-level polity and governance scheme of the EU enables to 
explain the involvement of other actors than states (e.g. EU institutions). Different levels 
of analysis combined with a liberal intergovernmental ism do not lead to a vaguer 
description.3 Neither states nor EU institutions, but both of them plus other players, such 
as private companies or international organizations influence the armament sector. 
However, the question of relevance of certain relationships was secured thanks to the 
focus of states.
2 Drulák, Petr; Teorie mezinárodních vztahů, Portál, Praha 2003, pp. 193
3 See e.g. Buzan, Barry; Waever, Ole; de Wilde, Jaap; Security. A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder: 
Lyne Reinner Publishers, London 1998
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Armaments cooperation includes many issues which are relevant to the subject 
but do not constitute a single major influence. Strategic plans of individual member 
states, market forces, company views, regional development -  these are all influential 
factors which help to define the sector’s complexity. Legally, armament cooperation 
belongs to two pillars of the EU construction. Market issues hidden in the first 
community pillar and ESDP as a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the 
second pillar complicate the problem in the horizontal perspective. The cross-pillar 
subject includes different legal provisions and different driving forces.
How then to analyze European armament integration? We have to use the concept 
of organizational fields within which there are various regimes and actors. To each 
individual field we can attribute a specific issue and an actor. With an analysis of two 
organizational fields we can make a second step - a synthesis of the findings.
Table 1: Fields and Issue of Armaments4
Defence Field -  Anarchy and 
Intergovernmental Cooperation
Market Field — Interdependence 
and Supranational Cooperation
Dynamics End of the Cold War, Internationalization of high-tech
Military interoperability industry, the internal market
Prime issues Petersberg tasks, Common Joint European armaments market
Task Forces, Partnership for Peace: - European companies
ESDI, ESDP
Prime actors NATO, WEU, EU (second pillar) EU (first pillar, industry
4 Mörth, Ulrika and Britz, Malena; European Integration as Organizing: The Case of Armaments, Journal 
of Common Market Studies, Volume 42., Number 5., pp. 963
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1.2  C r it ic a l  b o o k  r e v ie w /C e n t r e s  o f  e x c e l l e n c e
The literature on armaments in Europe is broad and multi-faceted. In order to 
avoid partial or irrelevant views, one has to consider a large number o f titles. Therefore, a 
critical book review is an essential part o f the research. The paper was based on five 
major sources which were: primary sources, secondary literature, interviews with some 
actors, direct observation and access to documents of selected think-tanks and centres of 
excellence. This is also a reason why the paper should be seen as a unique contribution to 
the EU politics research.
Primary sources were principally used to provide legal explanations for certain 
developments in armaments cooperation. They are comprised of the founding treaties of 
the European Communities and Council decisions as well as various Commission green 
papers or white books. The annual volume of EU  Security and Defence Core Documents 
served the author as a valuable contribution and practical guide.5 It is a collection of most 
important EU official and semi-official texts which deal with CFSP/ESDP affairs. The 
Commission’s SP series, designed to inform the college of Commissioners about the 
discussions in the committees of the European Parliament was another valuable source.6 
Publication of the Green Paper on Defence Procurement and subsequent public 
consultation period resulted in an anthology of replies from member states, major defence 
companies from Europe and the USA accessible via internet. It served the author as a 
comparison of the views of states and companies.
5 EU Security and Defence. Core Documents 2005, Volume VI., Chaillot Papers 87, EU Institute for 
Security Studies, Paris
6 Commissioners meet on regular basis in order to discuss and decide political and economical matters in 
the closed meeting called -  the college.
9
Secondly, while there were very few comprehensive books on armaments in 
Europe available, the major secondary sources involved numerous studies specialized on 
specific aspects of the defence sector. They were usually issued as policy papers by 
think-tanks or research centres. Unlimited access to the Central Library o f the EU in 
Brussels enabled the author to get dozens of articles dealing with various dimensions of 
many armaments problems in the EU. The same applied to the European Voice on-line 
archive -  an independent and recognised EU weekly newspaper.
Enriching insight into the problematic was possible due to three interviews done 
with main actors. To secure an impartial approach, three interviews with the member 
state representative and two Commission higher-ranked officials had been conducted.
Direct observation was the last but significant and complex input into the author’s 
understanding of the EU institutional setting, its proceedings and power distribution. It 
was a wonderful opportunity to hear many state and EU representatives and their 
opinions on the broad political guidelines in the ESDP.7
The balance between Europe and the USA is a traditional debate which has 
immediate consequences in the armaments sector. To find a proper perspective; the 
studies, publications and articles written by the American authors coming from major 
think-tanks such as RAND or Brookings Institute on the one side o f the Atlantic and the 
Brussels Centre for Political studies and the European Union Institute for Security 
Studies based in Paris were included.
7 The author spent five months during the autumn traineeship period at the European Commission in 
Brussels in 2005-2006. He was tasked to write minutes of the Foreign Affairs Committee meetings and 
hearings in the European Parliament. The Committee had two sub-committees: for human rights and for 
security and defence chaired by Mr. Johannes Wogau.
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2 . D e f e n c e  in d u st r y  s e c t o r  c h a r a s t e r is t ic s
The defence industry sector has its own specific features which are almost unique. 
Armament policy frequently interlinks with military superiority at the core of state 
objectives. The relationship between the state and its defence industry is often labelled as 
a military-industry complex. To clarify the term we will use the theoretical concept of 
two organizational fields with two different sets of rules and actors where one affects the 
other and vice versa. It is necessary to analyze armaments sector characteristics as such in 
order to fully understand trends and obstacles in the way of a common armament policy 
in the EU. There are four major factors to be examined. Two external characteristics are 
economic globalization and the new security environment together with the revolution in 
military affairs. Two internal specifics are market fragmentation and the evolution of the 
ESDP. Whereas economic globalization and market fragmentation are primarily 
economic issues, security environment and ESDP are of a political nature.8
8 Guy, Terrence and Callum, Robert; The Transformation and Future Prospects of Europe’s Defence 
Industry, International Affairs 78/4,2002,757-776
2 .1  G l o b a l iz a t io n  a n d  C o n s o l id a t io n
Economic globalization strengthening competition on the global scale was one of 
the prevailing processes in the world markets throughout the 90s. It had certain impacts 
in the defence industry field. The US government was first to realize it shortly after the 
fall of the Berlin wall. Therefore, the Department of Defence supported consolidation and 
mergers amongst major US defence companies. The state and its tenders could not be so 
attractive for defence companies any more. Given the defence spending reductions, the 
US government tried to find new possibilities for American firms in the world via 
promotion and support of arms sales.9 It started a push for access to the new foreign 
markets including in recently liberated Eastern Europe. The effort led to a series of 
mergers of big US companies which resulted in the establishment of four “mega-primes” 
aerospace firms: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon and 
several sub-contactors which focused on high-level subsystem supply.10 American 
suppliers were ranked in four out of the first five places in defence revenues. In general, 
US corporations make up half o f the list of top 100 companies. For more details see 
Table 2. The combat in arms export started.
9 Military spending declined from 400 bil. USD in 1989 to 281 bil. USD in 2001.
10 The term “mega-primes” originally referred to four biggest defence companies. See Hayward, Keith; The 
Globalization of Defence Industries, Survival, vol. 40, no. 2, Summer 2000, pp. 115-132, The International 
Institute for Strategic Studies
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Table 2: Top ten defence companies in the World (2000)11






% of revenue 
from defence
1. Lockheed Martin Corp. US 1 18 000 25 329 71
2. Boeing Co. US 2 17 000 51 321 33
3. Raytheon Co. us 4 14 033 16 895 83
4. BAE Systems UK 3 13 248 18 399 72
5. General Dynamics Corp. us 5 6 542 10 356 63
6. Northrop Grumman Corp. us 7 5 600 7618 74
7. EADS France 6 4 560 22 799 20
8. Thales France 8 4 262 7 411 58
9. United Technologies Corp. US 10 4 130 26 583 16
10 TRW Inc. US 9 4 000 17 200 23
Consolidation o f the vast US defence market forced its European counterparts to 
do something about their industry. Trans-national companies emerged only in late 90s. 
European consolidation started around the European Aerospace and Defence Company 
(EADC), common project of six major arms producing countries -  France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
It was the United Kingdom which announced in January 1999 that the UK’s 
aviation leader British Aerospace would instead of trans-national consolidation be 
merging with another British company GEC-Marconi, which specialized in defence 
electronics, regardless the fact that British Aerospace was at that time engaged in 
negotiations with DASA, the aerospace division of German Daimler-Chrysler. A lost 
opportunity for a truly pan-European defence company was realized shortly after when
11 Guy, Terrence and Callum, Robert; pp. 762
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EADC agreed on a cross-border merger with DASA, Aérospatiale-Matra and Spain’s 
Constructiones Aeronauticas (CASA) in 1999 to form the European Aeronautic Defence 
and Space Company (EADS) without UK participation. Nonetheless, two thirds of 
EADS s revenues in 2002 came from the civilian aircraft production unit of Airbus where 
BAe Systems had a 20% share. There were other examples of successful trans-European 
mergers such as establishment of defence electronics giant Thales in June 2000, second 
biggest world helicopter producer Augusta Westland in 2001 (after Boeing) or second 
largest missiles maker MBDA (after Raytheon) formed in 2001.
The EADS company consists of three groups of shareholders: 30% owned by 
public shareholders and traded on the Amsterdam stock exchange, a second third held by 
German Daimler-Chrysler and the remaining part held by the French private sector and 
government.12 However, Europe maintained a complicated ownership structure in its 
defence sector whereas US companies are, on the contrary, mainly in private hands. 
Some experts talk about the “European spaghetti bowl”.13
European defence sector consolidation at the business level had two approaches. 
Given BAe Systems’ solution, the first was managed through the consolidation of 
national markets within national borders. The second approach preferred trans-European 
mergers of “national champions”. Both types enjoyed key role and the full support of 
national governments.14
BAe Systems was the only company which was, according to the views of 
experts, considered as a case for a first large transatlantic merger between European and
12 von Wogau, Karl (ed.); The Path to European Defence, Maklu, Antwerpen 2004, pp. 232-233
13 Keohane, Daniel; The EU and Armaments Cooperation, Center for European Reform, London 2002, pp.8
14 Maulny, Jean-Pierre; Industrial and Strategic Co-operation Models for Armaments Companies in Europe, 
IRIS, 2003
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American firms.15 It would be a rare occasion as foreign investment in the USA is highly 
restricted.16 After the proliferation of new threats in the 90s and thorough security 
measures introduced after the 11 September 2001 attacks, the US government and the 
Congress tried to monitor and prevent any possibility of hi-tech or sensitive technologies 
being sold into the hands of terrorists. Thanks to the “special relationship” which was 
established between the UK and the USA decades ago, British corporations have much 
easier access to US defence market and technologies whereas German or French 
corporations are not trusted. For a possible transatlantic merger, only BAE Systems is a 
suitable candidate both economically as well as strategically. Even though the US market 
was hard to penetrate, UK companies were able to secure up to 50% share of US imports. 
In total, the UK defence industry exports more goods and services to the US than to 
Europe. BAE Systems is the fourth largest defence contractor in the USA.17
15 Guy, Terrence and Callum, Robert; pp. 761
16 Nones, Michele and Damis, Jean.Pierre; Control of Foreign Investments in Aerospace and Defence, The 
International Spectator 3/2005,83-90
17 Input to the Consultation on the Green Paper on Defence Procurement by the Defence Manufacturers 
Association (DMA) of the United kingdom, January 2005 accessed via
http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemal_market/publicprocurement/dpp_en.htm#consultation, viewed 20 April 
2006
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2.2 N e w  se c u r it y  e n v ir o n m e n t
Reinvention of defence cooperation at the European level was initiated by the end 
of East-West conflict.18 The geopolitical situation after the fall of the Berlin Wall 
diminished for a while the need to foster arms races of two adversarial blocks. Politicians 
as well as academics rapidly believed that westem-style democracies won the battle for 
lasting peace. By then the only but generous “hard security” provider had been NATO 
and mainly the USA.19 American taxpayers started to question national politicians why 
they had to pay for the security of Europeans if the enemy number one -  the Soviet 
Union - was dissolved. The traditional and strong reasoning of the pro-isolation camp 
again clashed with a pro-intervention group in American politics.20 Jolyon Howorth 
pointed out:
„These two elements (European military inadequacy and US budgetary concerns) raised 
in acute form the question o f  how much longer the American public would be prepared to 
underwrite an alliance in which the European side was increasingly widely believed to be 
free-riding”. 21
Europeans thought that it was the right time to take the cash from the “peace 
dividend”. They lost a belief in the importance of the army and the need to pay the costs
18 Rusi, Alpo M.; Europe's Changing Security Role in Gärtner, Heinz; Hyde-Price, Adrian; Reiter, Erich 
(eds.); Europe's New Security Challenges, Lynne Reiner publishers, London 2001, pp. 119-120
19 Missiroli, Antonio; CFSP, Defence and Flexibility, Chaillot Papers 28, Institute for Security Studies 
WEU, Paris 2000, pp. 12
20 For father details see: Sloan, Stanley R., The United States and European Defence, Chaillot Papers 39, 
Institute for Security Studies WEU, Paris 2000
21 Howorth, Molton; European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Change?, Chaillot Papers 43, 
Institute for Security Studies WEU, Paris 2000, pp. 21
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of feeling secure. It was not only European taxpayers which started to be reluctant to 
allocate their taxes for defence purposes. It became a global trend to decrease financial 
resources dedicated to the defence budget. However the trend was shifted in the first 
decade of the 21st century. See Table 3a and 3b.
Table 3a: NATO Defence expenditures as % of gross domestic product 1975-199922













1995 1996 1997 1996 1999e
(0) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Based on current prices /  Stir la base des prix courants
Belgium 3,2 3.3 2^ 2,0 1,6 W 1,5 1,5 1,5
Czech Repubfc II II II If // // // // 2,2
Denmaric 2,3 2,4 Ifi 19 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,6 16
fiance 31 3,9 3,8 3,4 3,1 ЗЛ 2,9 18 2Л
Gesmany 3,4 3 A зл 2,2 1,7 V 1.6 16 1,5
Greece 5,6 5,4 5,1 4,4 4,4 4,5 4.6 4,8 4,9
Hurgay I / II II I I // / / // // U
Italy 24 2,1 2J 2,1 U 1,9 i 0 2,0 2.0
Lnentoun] 0,9 U U> 0,9 0,6 M 0,9 0,9 0.9
Netheriands 3,1 3,1 2,9 2,4 2,0 Ю 1,9 18 L i
Nomay 2* 2,7 2.9 18 2,4 2,2 2,1 2,3 2,2
fcartd II II II i! / / II II //II 2,2
Portugal 3A 10 2,7 и 2,6 IA 2,3 2,2 U
Spain .. 2,3 U 17 1,5 15 1,4 14 L4
Turkey 4,4 4,0 3,3 3,8 3,9 4,1 4,1 4,4 5,7
Urited Kirgdom 4,9 5.2 45 3,8 3,0 ЗД 2,7 2,7 2,6
WO-Europe 3,5 V V 12 12 Ц 1 12
Csrada 19 2.0 2,1 1,9 1,5 У 1,2 12 1,2
United States Sfi 5.5 6-0 4,7 3,8 3,5 3,4 3,2 3,2
ilortMiwica V w 5 / (5 V V 13 V 10
JWD- Ш •• i,5 11 3,1 и и l i 17 1 l i
22 NATO Defence expenditures 1975-1999, accessed via http://www.nato.mt/docu/pr/l999ЛаЫсЗ.pdf, 20 
April 2006
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Table 3b: Defence expenditure in the EU and the USA2’
EU Country Defence Budget (bn USD) Defence Expenditure (GDP%)2001 2002 2003 2004 2001 2002 2003
United Kingdom 33,6 33,6 42 49 2.1 2,4 2,4
France 25,8 30,7 35,3 40 2,5 2,5 2,6
Germany 21,5 25,1 27,7 29,7 1,5 1,5 1,5
Italy 15,9 14,5 15,7 17,5 2 1,9 1,9
Spain 7.1 6,7 7,1 8 1,2 1,2 1,2
Netherlands 5,7 6,9 7,2 7,6 1,6 1,6 1,6
Sweden 4,1 4,6 5,5 5,9 2,1 1,9 1,8
Greece 3,4 3,6 3,6 3,7 4,6 4,3 4,1
Poland 3,4 3,5 3,9 4,4 2 1,9 2
Belgium 2,3 2,8 3 3,3 1,3 1,3 1,3
Denmark 2,1 2,2 2,6 2,9 1,6 1,6 1,6
Austria 1,5 1,8 2,5 2,7 0,8 0,8 1
Finland 1,4 2,1 2,3 2,6 1,2 1,4 1,4
Czech Republic 1,2 1,5 1,9 1,9 2,1 2 2,2
Portugal 1,6 1,7 1,9 2,1 2,1 2,3 2,1
Hungary 0,82 1,1 1,4 1,7 1,8 1,8 1,9
Ireland 0,79 0,78 0,8 0,86 0,5 0,6 0,5
Slovakia 0,35 0,46 0,62 0,72 1,7 1,9 1,9
Slovenia 0,28 0,27 0,38 0,46 1,4 1,2 1,4
Cyprus 0,35 0,26 0,29 0,15 2,6 2,4 2,3
Lithuania 0,17 0,27 0,27 0,31 1,8 1,8 1,8
Luxembourg 0,15 0,2 0,23 0,26 0,8 0,9 0,9
Latvia 0,08 0,11 0,19 0,23 1 1,3 1,9
Estonia 0,07 0,1 0,16 0,2 1,2 1,5 2
Malta 0,03 0,07 0,09 0,1 1,8 1,9 2,1
EU 25 133,67 147,94 166,64 186,28 1,9 1,9 1,9
USA 329 362,1 456,2 450,5 3 3,3 3,7
The potentially tragic consequences of such thinking were proved during the 
violent disintegration of former Yugoslavia. The European Communities, a dominant 
economic power, were unable to stop aggression and wide-spread human rights 
violations. Economic sanction and the soft power use of diplomacy were irrelevant face 
to face horrors of ethnic cleansing carried out by paramilitary troops. Adrian Hyde-Price 
brilliantly described the situation:
"3 Defence spending, EU ISS, Paris 2005, accessed via http://www.iss-eu.Org/esdp/l 1-bsdef pdf, 20 April 
2006
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“At the international level, the ‘‘clear and present danger” o f  Soviet aggression was 
superseded in the 1990s by more diffuse risks and challenges entailing a variety o f  
possible use o f  military force. Security concerns about major inter-state wars between 
great powers declined significantly, to be replaced by internationalized conflicts, often 
between sub-state actors, fuelled by domestic conflicts over identity and scare
„24resources.
New threats and challenges compelled European armies to respond via new types 
of missions. There were no tanks or big armies operating in the battle field. Terrorists, 
international criminal nets and armed non-state groups using guerrilla tactics, modem 
ways of communication and unconventional weapons against soft targets posed serious 
troubles to state-centric and military focused approaches to security which prevailed 
during Cold War times. Only broader concept of security explained why the number of 
peace-keeping or humanitarian missions increased and why scholars and officials have to 
take into account that also non-state actors can be possible enemies and parties to 
conflicts.
The geostrategic situation of the globalised world has its repercussions into 
armaments. In the case of Kosovo we could observe small paramilitary groups equipped 
with low-tech weapons worth only several thousand euros carrying out terrific violence. 
On the other hand these targets were counter attacked by “smart-bombs” fired from 
American special stealth jets from a distance of ten kilometres costing 1 million dollars 
each and causing highly sensitive collateral damages. Secondly, US authorities estimated
24 Ну de-Price, Adrian; European Security, Strategic Culture, and the USE of Force, European Security, 
Volume 13, Number 4/2004, pp. 331
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that the terrorist organization al-Qaeda spent up to half a million dollars in order to carry 
out devastating attacks on 11th September 2001. The damage to private-properties and 
infrastructure in the city of New York mounted to 11 billion dollars. Rescue and 
cleaning-up operations added on 14 billion dollars in costs. There are real lessons to be 
leamt from modem types o f conflicts for the effective use of force. Two examples of 
major possible sources of instability in the Europe have to be considered carefully with 
the aim to find proper and effective ways for response.
20
2 .3  E u r o p e a n  S e c u r it y  a n d  D e f e n c e  P o l ic y
External factors boosting the cooperation in the field of armaments would not be 
far-reaching without strong political backing. It would be senseless to speak about a 
single armaments policy in the EU without having a “European army”. European 
soldiers, regardless of being deployed under the EU or national flag, have to fight with 
equipment designed to combat threats of the 21st century. Concepts for cooperation in 
defence are not recent. However concrete steps on the way towards European 
independence in the international arena would gain it higher credibility.
After the effort to incorporate it into the system of the community law foreign and 
security agenda in Maastricht 1992 only few observers thought it would have a long- 
lasting impact. The Balkan wars confirmed such a view. On the other hand the EU gained 
at least a basic level of legality when speaking about external defence matters. Common 
foreign and security policy, the second pillar of the EU structure, added to the core 
market-related integration a significant political dimension.
The toothless reaction of the EU at the time of wars in former Yugoslavia 
changed dramatically the way in which European security had been considered so far. 
European public opinion demanded from its leaders not national but pan-European 
reaction. More than seven out of ten Europeans (EU 15) voiced out their belief that they 
would support Common Defence and Security Policy at the European level.25 The first 
political impacts came up during the Amsterdam negotiation.
For the first time, a treaty included the possibility of conducting so called 
“Petersberg missions”. The missions such as humanitarian, rescue and peace-keeping
25 Eurobarometer 54th Report, Support for key issues, Brussels, 2000
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operations were already adopted by the Western European Union in June 1992.26 The 
Amsterdam Treaty foresaw a future consolidation of the complicated security 
organizations architecture via incorporating the WEU into the EU framework. Since 
then, WEU Council could unanimously decide whether to send or not its member state 
armies into the above mentioned types of missions.27
It was the UK under Tony Blair which boosted defence cooperation in Europe 
during a visit to France in December 1998 where a St. Malo Declaration was signed. 
London’s aim was to engage Britain in European affairs after a decade of hesitation. On 
the other hand Jacques Chirac and the French were convinced that a stronger European 
defence identity could weaken the NATO and therefore the US influence in Europe. The 
compromise was aware of the fact that “hard-security”/collective defence was in Europe 
provided by NATO and at the same time it reads:
“ The Union must have the capacity fo r  autonomous action, backed by credible military 
forces, the means to decide to use them, and readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises... Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to 
the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence 
industry and technology.”2*
26 WEU Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19. June 1992, in. 
http ://www. cip. fiihem. es/ueh/documentos/ueo/92-petersberg.htm, 16.3.2003
i7 The decision to put the WEU under the EU framework was carried out at the WEU Ministerial Council 
meeting in Marseille on 13 November 2000. The EU took over its Petersberg functions and the WEU in 
fact ceased to exit.
28 Rutten, Maartje (compiled by); From St-Malo to Nice. European defence: core documents, ISS WEU, 
Paris 2001, pp. 8-9
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The UK “sea change” did not change the traditional “special relationship”. British 
political circles understood that the Americans wished to have strong European allies 
being able and prepared to intervene in situations in which NATO was not engaged. This 
activity must not be a duplication of NATO and EU resources. Complementarity and 
compatibility of assets instead of unbalanced burden sharing was the desired target.
The British government did not act without the prior support of the USA which 
agreed upon the enhanced role for the European pillar of NATO. Europeans should be 
strengthened via European Security and Defence Initiative using the concept of 
Combined Joint Task Forces which were in fact double-hatted.29 These troops were at the 
disposal of the WEU as well as NATO. Based on the North Atlantic Council in Berlin 
1996 WEU-led operations could have access to the capabilities, assets and headquarters 
of the Alliance (Berlin Plus Agenda).30 NATO-EU agreement from December 2003 
specified Berlin Plus arrangements. It covered three main elements that were directly 
connected to operations and which could be combined: EU access to NATO planning, 
NATO European command options and use of NATO assets and capabilities.31
A real impetus to the creation of the “European army” was driven by a decision 
taken at the December 1999 Helsinki European Council meeting. The European Headline 
Goal called for EU member states to be able to deploy 60,000 troops, within 60 days and 
sustainable for a year in support of the Petersberg Tasks by 2003. EU-led Rapid Reaction
29 The troops could be used for NATO but for EU missions as well. The US declared its position at the 50th 
anniversary NATO summit in 1998. The Secretary of State Madeleine Albright articulated what would 
become known as the „Three Ds“ of NATO weapons policy: that there must not be no decoupling of the 
United States from NATO, duplication of effort of resources or discrimination against NATO allies.
Rutten, Maartje (compiled by); From St-Malo to Nice. European Defence: core documents, Volume I., 
Chaillot Papers 47, ISS WEU, Paris 2001, pp. 10
10 NATO Handbook Documentation, NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels 1999, pp. 370-385
31 Missiroli, Antonio (compiled by); From Kopenhagen to Brussels. European Defence: core documents, 
Volume IV, Chaillot Papers 67, ISS EU, Paris 2003, pp. 48-49
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Forces assembled in response to a crisis would last only for the duration of the crisis and 
it would be up to the member states themselves to decide whether, when and how to 
contribute troops.32 Further on, EU established number of specific ESDP structures to 
take care about the military and strategic planning. Today there are: EU Military 
committee, EU Military staff, European Defence Agency, EU Institute for Security 
Studies and EU Satellite Centre.
Limits to defence integration were set by the fact that the Presidency conclusions 
from Helsinki contained a sentence, which clearly stated, “This process does not imply 
creation of the European army”.33
Since January 2003 the EU had conducted fifteen different types of missions 
ranging from the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Sarajevo, over military 
operation ALTEMIS in the Congolese province of Ituri, EUJUST THEMIS mission to 
support transformation of the judicial system in Georgia or the Border Assistance 
Mission at Rafah crossing point in the Palestinian territories (EU BAM Rafah).34
Besides the troubles with sizing the Rapid Reaction Forces there were huge 
obstacles with the capabilities of these troops. Shortfalls were discussed at the first 
Brussels Capabilities Commitment Conference on 20th November 2000 were each 
member state declared its national assets to the European Headline Goal. The 
commitments were specified in the “Force Catalogue”. In total it was declared that in 
order to achieve EHG, the EU needed to pool 100,000 personnel, 400 combat aircraft and
32 Rutten, Maartje (compiled by); From St-Malo to Nice. European defence: core documents, Volume I, 
Chaillot Papers 47, ISS WEU, Paris 2001, pp. 82-83
33 Ibid., pp. 82
34 See the official sites of Ihe Council of the EU, http://ue.eu.int/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en&mode=g,
17 April 2006
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100 naval vessels.35 The Conference also made it possible to identify a number of areas in 
which efforts were needed to upgrade existing assets, investment, development, and 
coordination to enhance the capabilities required for autonomous EU action. Last but not 
least, a short appreciation of defence industry restructuring in certain member states was 
done while it encouraged the development of European capabilities. Airbus A400M 
transport aircraft and Troop Transport Helicopters NH 90 projects were mentioned as 
successful examples of transnational European defence industry cooperation. 36
One year on, at the Capability Improvement Conference (CIC) member states 
identified additional shortcomings and agreed on a plan of action to remedy them. The 
European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) was presented at the Laeken European Summit 
in December 2001. Nineteen panels of experts were set-up. Each was led by one “leading 
nation”. They were tasked to bridge the gaps in the “shortcomings” catalogue (see Table 
4). Ministers recognized the important role of European industry while linking the 
strength and competitiveness of the European industrial and technological base and the 
success of the ECAP.37
35 Rutten, Maartje (compiled by); From Nice to Laeken. European defence: core documents, Volume II, 
Chaillot Papers 51, ISS EU, Paris 2002, pp. 95-100
36 Ibid., pp. 100
37 Ibidem
25
Table 4: European Capability Action Plan -  19 panels’8
Panels
Attack Helicopters/Support Helicopters
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Protection (NBC)
Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV)/Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) Units 
Medical Role 3/Medical Collective Protection Role 3 
Special Operations Forces (SOF)
Carrier Based Air Power
Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD)
Air-to-Air Refueling (AAR)
Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR)
Cruise Missiles/Precision Guided Munitions 
Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence 
Deployable Communication Modules 
Headquarters (OHQ, FHQ, CCHQs)
Theatre Surveillance and Reconnaissance Air Picture
Strategic ISR IMINT Collection
UAV (HALE, MALE and tactical UAVs)
Early Warning and Distant Detection Strategic Level
Strategic Air Mobility/Outsized Transport Aircraft, General Cargo Aircraft
Roll-On-Roll-Off Vessels (RO-RO)/General Cargo Shipping__________________
Some of these shortfalls could be addressed through short-term solutions such as 
leasing or upgrading. For a number o f shortfalls, including some related to strategic 
capabilities, a long-term solution requires large-scale procurement projects to be
38 Schmitt, Burkard; European Capabilities Action Plan, ISS EU, 2005, pp. 1 and 2, www.iss- 
eu.org/esdp/06-bsecap.pdf, 16 April 2006
developed. Some of these collaborative projects are already under way, while others are 
not. Compare Table 4 with Table 5.
Table 5: Ongoing Collaborative Programmes39
PROGRAMMES PARTICIPATION DESCRIPTION
A400M Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, 
Luxembourg, UK, Portugal, Turkey
Future transport aircraft
Air command and control 
system
NATO countries Command and control support system for air 
operations integrated at the European level
BONUS France, Sweden Guided anti-tank shell programme
BREVEL Germany, France Remote-controlled light drone system
COBRA Germany, France, UK Counter-battery radar
EH 101 Italy, UK Military transport helicopter
EUROFIGHTER Germany, Spain, Italy, UK New generation combat aircraft
Future Ground-to-Air Family France, Italy Air defence systems family
HELIOS Helios I: France, Italy, Spain 
Helios II: France, Belgium
Optical observation system
HORIZON France, Italy New generation anti-aircraft frigates
HOT Germany, France Long-range wire-guided anti-tank missile
New Generation Multiple 
Rocket Launcher
Germany, US, France, Italy, UK Precision rocket, modernization fire control 
system and exercise rocket





Spain, US, France, Italy, Germany High-speed inter-ally and inter-army tactical 
data transmission system
MILAN Germany, France, UK Medium-range portable wire-guided anti-tanl 
missile
MRAV Germany, Netherlands Multi-role armoured vehicle
MU 90 France, Italy Light torpedo for anti-submarine combat 
vessels
New Generation Identification 
Friend or Foe
Germany, France New generation air-to-air and ground-to-air 
Identification friend or foe system
NH 90 Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal
Military transport helicopter
Principal Anti-Aircraft Missile 
System
France, Italy, UK Principal weapons system of future Franco- 
Italian Horizon and British T45 anti-aircraft 
frigates
POLYPHEME Germany, France, Italy Fibre-optic guided missiles
RITA Belgium, France Modernization of RITA tactical 
telecommunications network
SCALPE EG/Storm Shadow France, UK, Italy Long-range wire-guided anti-tank missile
SLAT Anti-Torpedo Combat 
System
France, Italy Anti-torpedo detection and reaction system fc 
surface vessels
TIGER Germany, France New generation combat helicopter
39 Schmitt, Burkard; Armaments Cooperation in Europe, ISS EU, Paris 2005, http://www.iss-eu.org/esdp/, 20 April 2006
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For the first time we could read in the Council’s Conclusions that the National 
Armaments Directors of the EU member states were welcome to participate in the ECAP 
process which could lead to the establishment of “intergovernmental defence capabilities 
development and acquisition agency” which would enhance armaments cooperation in 
Europe.40 Under given conditions, it was widely assumed that a bottom-up approach 
could bring better results then weak political declarations at the European level.
Burkard Schmitt list four major weak points of the ECAP process. First of all, it is 
the voluntary concept of contributions. No member state can be forced to fund properly 
reserved capabilities. Secondly, the technical level and numerous panels at which ECAP 
was discussed proved a lack clear political leadership. Although there were certain 
timelines and reporting procedures, it was a limited approach to the European military 
capability both in time (current shortfalls) and scope (dealing solely with EHG 
problems).41
Having many troubles creating the troops for EHG, member states decided to go 
step by step and start with much less ambitious goals. At the June 2004 European Council 
meeting, heads o f states and governments tabled a new “2010 Headline Goal”. It was 
based on the concept of thirteen multinational battle groups of up to 1,500 men. The 
priority was given to quality then quantity.
Based on the exchange of views with General Jean-Paul Perruche, Director of the 
European Union Military Staff, battle groups are military forces with pre-identified
40 Missiroli, Antonio (compiled by); From Kopenhagen to Brussels. European Defence: core documents, 
Volume IV, Chaillot Papers 67, ISS EU, Paris 2003, pp. 91
41 Schmitt, Burkard; European Capabilities Action Plan, ISS EU, 2005, pp. 3-4, www.iss-eu.org/esdp/06- 
bsecap.pdf, 16 April 2006
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capabilities, which member states would deploy as a rapid reaction force.42 There would 
be one (German) battlegroup on alert throughout 2006, followed by two on alert on a six- 
month rotational basis. The EU should be capable of taking decisions to launch 
battlegroups within five days of a Council decision to act, with operations on the ground 
ten days after that, giving a deployment period of 15 days.43 The battlegroups could be 
used to intervene in all areas of ESDP and would be particularly adapted to evacuating 
nationals and providing assistance to humanitarian missions. Full operational capability is 
expected by the beginning of the year 2007.44
Once a full operational capability is reached in 2007, the EU should have the 
capacity to undertake (and launch nearly simultaneously) two concurrent single battalion­
sized rapid response operations. Further on, at the Military Capability Conference in 
Brussels it was agreed that:
“The newly established European Defence Agency will play crucial role in the 
improvement framework fo r  capability development. Its mission is to assist Member 
States ’ efforts to improve their military capabilities to sustain ESDP as it stands now and 
develops in the fu ture.,y45
42 Exchange of views, European Parliament: Meeting of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence 
Brussels, 21 February 2006
43 EU Security and Defence. Core documents 2004, Chaillot Papers 75, Volume V, ISS EU, Paris 2005, pp. 
63
44 Ibid., pp 301
45 Ibid., pp 304
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3. E u r o p e a n  d e f e n c e  e q u ip m e n t  m a r k e t  -  c u r r e n t  o b s t a c l e s
The European Defence and Equipment Market enabling free movement of 
defence goods and services has not been fully working yet. There are legal and political 
reasons for this situation. Following chapter tries to find out which reasons and traditions 
there are. Only states possess sufficient political power to remove these obstacles. They 
decide whether free competition will be allowed to dominate the common European 
market. Single but certainly highly important issue has been defence procurement. 
Recently, new trends in defence procurement, integral part o f the European armaments 
cooperation, positively affected the development of a more transparent and accountable 
European market with defence goods and services.
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3.1 R o l e  o f  t h e  s t a t e
There are several reasons for the strong influence of the state in the defence 
sector. The number of relationships between state institutions and the defence industry 
creates a dense net of interactions. The complex nature of the so-called military-industry 
complex attaches to this term mixed and somewhat grey connotations. Therefore a closer 
look at the relationship could enhance our understanding of its specifics.
The dominant role of the state in defence markets across Europe remains unchanged. 
However, limited achievements followed after the privatization processes throughout the 
last decade of the 20th Century. Apart from historical reasons to a strong state 
involvement in this particular field of industry there is a list of five major functions:
a. The states, as sole clients on the demand side o f the free market, determine the 
demand for products according to their strategic objectives and therefore define 
the size and the scope of the market with defence goods and services.
b. The states finance military research and development influencing the 
technological level of know-how and long term competitiveness of many non­
military branches of industry.
c. As a traditional regulatory body of the arms trade, state institutions usually issue 
export licenses. It applies actually on the intra-European trade, which should be 
governed by the EU acquis communitaire (EU law).46
46 The term “intra-European” trade refers to the trading activities among members of the European Union 
respecting community law provisions applied to the common market.
d. The state is also the supreme authority for calls for tender. Through this effective 
tool it is possible to restrict competition on the European market.
e. States can also control industrial restructuring and levels of shareholding. The 
“Buy American Act” for example sets minimal qualifications and maximum 
shares for foreign companies in order to qualify for a tender in the USA.47
Security of supply is one of the major concerns of states. For any state/client it is vital 
to have fixed and solid guarantee of the supply ranging in time horizon from the 
development of an arms program, testing period, actual use until its withdrawal from the 
service together with a guarantee of maintenance works during peace and war.
There are two serious consequences of security of supply. First, high level of a state 
autonomy and independence can be achieved through national suppliers and producers. A 
national arena of firms and contracting authorities sets up a military-industry complex. 
Secondly, an important question of technological supremacy, which makes the difference 
in modem warfare, is secured by special national measures (e.g. security clearances) 
carried by national agencies in order to grant the confidentiality of the supplier’s 
armaments programs. Any misuse or disclosure of sensitive technologies can give any 
potential enemy strategic advantage.
The development of defence systems has its implication for military as well as civil 
use. The time between the expression of an operational need and the end of the system’s 
life (system is discarded from the army equipment) may last well beyond a fifty-year 
period. Since production volumes are limited and the risk of commercial failure is high,
47 Nones, Michele and Damis, Jean.Pierre; Control of Foreign Investments in Aerospace and Defense, The 
International Spectator 3/2005,83-90
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companies request guaranteed prices whereas states require quality. Special relations 
between the demand and supply have to be established. In the case of defence companies, 
it is the relationship between the government and defence industry.
In addition, “off-the-shelf’ arms purchases are often conducted under offset 
conditions, which are set up by the state. This allows the purchasing country to require a 
return of investment that can exceed the original value of the contract. Offsets can be 
direct, in the form of orders for local companies or in the form of know-how and 
technology transfers. Indirect offsets, concerns non-military industrial sectors. Offset 
policies are related to huge amounts of the capital invested in the given state and region. 
Any inconveniences and sudden changes can lead to the job loses. Politics is therefore at 
high stake in this specific field of business.
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3 .2  M a r k e t  f r a g m e n t a t io n
While globalization and the changing geopolitical environment are trends which 
force European states to cooperate on armaments, European defence market 
fragmentation has serious cooperation slow-down impacts (see Chapter 2.1).
A young rank-and-file European will not be surprised that the four economical 
freedoms are freely floating in the EU nowadays. It is not the case of defence goods and 
services which are exempted from the regime of free movement in the internal market 
since the very beginning of the European integration process. In other words, there are 25 
different import/export custom rates, administrative provisions and arms trade policies 
being set up even though one of the core reasons to start the integration in Europe after 
the Second World War was the control of strategic military related industries -  coal and 
steel sectors. It was a security rather than economic interest.
To establish a common European Defence Equipment Market (EDEM) many 
things have to change. The trading between suppliers and customers must not be 
restricted. There are several benefits of the EDEM. Companies could operate on a larger 
market than only national. They could also rationalize their production in order to achieve 
the economy of scale. Transnational cooperation would reduce unnecessary duplication. 
Competition among suppliers would project in reduced prices.
A concept of full autarky in other than strategic and defence matters led to a 
traditional split into the national defence markets.48 It affected the size of the market and 
its ability to cover sufficiently increasing costs of the research and development of the
48 See the thorough analysis in: The Green Paper on Defence Procurement, European Commission, Brussels
2004
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complex arms systems. There are no doubts about it among the experts. Either the 
national defence market borders dismantle or the European taxpayers have to pay more 
for the equipment of their armies.
Since as early as 1957, single market community law, the dominant harmonizing 
factor, cannot be fully applied to the defence related materials and services. According to 
article 296 EC of the Treaty, the special nature of the defence sector has been recognized
“No Member State shall be obliged to supply information the disclosure o f  which 
it considers contrary to the essential interests o f  its security; any Member state may take 
such measures as it considers necessary fo r  the protection o f  the essential interests o f  its 
security which are connected with the production o f  or trade in arms, munitions and war 
material; such measures shall not adversely affect the conditions o f  competition in the 
common market regarding products which are not intended fo r  specifically military
«4 9purposes.
The extensive list of products, which fall under the provisions of the above 
mentioned paragraph, was adopted by the Council in 1958. The considered Article 296 is 
wide in its definition and therefore in its use as well. Member States often misuse the 
Article and apply it to items falling under public procurement directive which is ill-suited 
for defence procurement specifics.
49 Schmidt, Burkard (compiled by); European armaments cooperation. Core documents, Chaillot Papers 59, 
ISS EU, Pans 2003
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The recently adopted Directive 2004/18/EC (Article 10)50 on public procurement 
states that even the contract awarding authorities in the field of defence have to comply 
with it. Civilian goods or those not intended for specific military purposes should not be 
subject for Member States Article 296 derogation. The Court of Justice has issued several 
interpretations. One of the most profound examples of “incorrect” derogation was 
considered in the Spain. Spanish law from 1987 exempted exports and imports of hard 
defence material from value added tax (VAT). But the Community law stated that all 
intra-Community trade was subject to VAT and contained no exemption but for military 
use. The European Court of Justice disagreed with the Spanish derogation based on the 
article 296 and ruled against Spain.51
Member States still use the derogation principal extensively -  a fact which can be 
well depicted from the low number of tender publications in the Official Journal of the 
European Union.
Resting upon national legislation, using exemptions from national public 
procurements, Member States create disadvantages for possible non-national suppliers. 
The publication of the contract notice is often hidden in the national publication journal. 
Technical details are pre-designed to fit to the specifications, which only national firms 
are able to fulfil. Tendering is held trough unclear negotiation procedure. Due to the lack 
of transparency and competitiveness in the defence market some Member States decided 
to establish intergovernmental political agreements with the single aim of improving this 
situation. The success of such an activity had to be limited from the very beginning as 
these agreements were not legally biding.
50 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination 
of procedures or the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts
51 See the case Commission o f the European Communities v Kingdom o f  Spain, C-414/97
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3 .3  D e f e n c e  p r o c u r e m e n t
A new debate on the establishment of the European Defence Equipment Market 
where Community law would be folly applied started at the European level. Top-down 
initiatives prepared by two subsequent Commissions (Prodi and Barroso) resulted in 
several Communications and reports. According to Eurostat estimates, total defence 
expenditure by the EU 25 in 2003 represented € 169 billion (1.7% GDP) which include 
€82 billion of defence procurement (0.8 GDP), of which €30 billion was for defence 
equipment (0.3% GDP) - whereas the US defence budget was more than twice the 
combined defence budget of the EU 25. The US allocated four times as much as the EU 
to defence procurement and five times as much to research and technology.52
Romano Prodi’s Commission released a Communication: European Defence -  
Industrial and Market Issues -  Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy.53 This 
document tried to continue the work started by the Commissioner for industry Erkki 
Liikanen who issued Communication on the challenges facing the European defence- 
related industry.54 Secondly, a new Communication was aimed to give a formal and 
unbiased foundation to various semi-formal reports such as START 21 report which was 
compiled by an unofficial group of experts (heads of multinational defence companies, 
members of European parliament, Javier Solana and a few Commissioners). START 21 
was also a controversial material. It contained similar wording as the strategic document
52 Briefing file for Commissioner Ferrero Waldner, 16 November 2005, Strasbourg, pp. 7
53 Communication from the Commission to the Council The European Parliament, The European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions: European Defence -  Industrial and Market Issues -  
Towards an EU Defence Equipment Policy, COM (2003) 113
54 Communication COM (96) 10 and Communication on the challenges facing the European defence- 
related industry, COM (1997) 583
published by AECMA -  an aerospace lobby group.55 Member states jointly rejected the 
START 21 report. Major concern was raised as regards an involvement of the 
bureaucratic organization acting mainly in non-military fields (European Commission) in 
the armaments without previous solid experience with the sector.
While the member states were reluctant to go forward in defence matters, the 
European Commission took on responsibilities concerning market issues where it had 
significant powers. The Commission proposed the subordination of the defence market 
under the first pillar leaving complicated political effects aside. The focus on market 
issues such as competition, state aid or procurement became an important part of the 
debate on the EU responsibilities over the defence sector. The debate was launched as a 
response to the European Parliament Resolution of 10 April 2002.
The 2003 Communication identified seven fields for an action: standardization, 
monitoring of defence-related industries, intra-Community transfers, competition, 
procurement rules, export control of dual-use goods and research. This time even the 
Council reacted in a positive way. It welcomed the Communication
“as a valuable contribution towards creating the necessary conditions fo r  strengthening 
the industrial and market situation o f  European businesses, which are directly or 
indirectly linked with defence equipment market... which could lead to greater cost 
effectiveness and more efficient planning and procurement o f  defence equipment.”56
55 Mawdsley, Jocelyn; Policy Choices Ahead for the EU on Armaments in: Mawdsley, Jocelyn; Martinelli, 
Marta and Ramacle, Eric (eds.); Europe and the Global Arms Agenda: Security, Trade and Accountability, 
Nomos, Baden-Baden 2004, pp. 42
56 Council Conclusions of 13 May 2003, Official Journal С149, 26/06/2003
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The Green Paper on Defence Procurement, published on 23 September 2004, 
establishing official consultation procedure between the Commission and any interested 
party was in fact a follow up of the latter.57 The intention of the document was to help all 
stakeholders design future market regulations on the defence procurement where any 
company would be dealing with the same and fair set of rules and procedures for 
developing, delivering and supporting equipment as well as tendering for contracts. It 
should concern products and services procured by national defence ministries as well as 
the European Defence Agency.
Public procurement Directives were applicable in principle to all sectors, 
including defence. Open tendering could cause the undesired release of classified 
information specifying technical details of the contract’s subject. Therefore, it was 
assumed that the defence sector was somehow special and would deserve its own legal 
instrument. The hidden leitmotiv was to substantially support cross-border competition 
of small and medium enterprises.58
In the first part of the document the Commission presented the state of play of 
European defence procurement. National defence procurement procedures greatly varied; 
tender publication, specifications, selection and award criteria constructed regulatory 
patchwork which lacked transparency. Additionally, national governments used the 
Article 296 as an excuse for any type of defence contract.
The Green Paper identified two initiatives to improve unclear interpretation of the 
current legal provisions -  a communication and directive, the instruments to be put 
forward into the public consultation. The former should clarify existing Community law
57 Green Paper on Defence Procurement, European Commission, Brussels 2004
58 Press Release, MEMO/04/222, Brussels 23 September 2004
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and specify the criteria for the use of the Article 296. The European Court of Justice had 
not declared any guideline on how to interpret “essential interest of security”. The 
Communication would guide national procurement authorities. However; legally 
speaking, there is no force behind it as it is a “soft law”.59 According to its idea, member 
states had to assess on a case-by-case basis whether the contract is covered by the 
exemption or not. The burden of proof stated that essential security interests invoking 
derogation from rules of the internal market lay with member states. In this respect, the 
European Commission should exercise its role as a guardian of treaties and if member 
states breach the community law the Commission had the duty to refer the matter to the 
European Court of Justice. The Interpreting Communication would enhance transparency 
and competition for non-warlike items which did not constitute great cost-savings related 
to complex defence systems. Secondly, the continuity of the status quo doubled with the 
Communication would not clarify the situation. The Commission would be forced to take 
an action and refer controversial procurements to the Court. The number of legal disputes 
would thus increase.60
The second possibility -  the Defence Procurement Directive -  would cover 
tenders within the remit of the Article 296 for which the use of the derogation was not 
justified. The ill-suited Public Procurement Directive could be replaced taking into 
account specific nature of defence including flexible measures on security of supply and 
confidentiality. The issue of the “essential security interest” would not be solved either. 
Nevertheless, member states would get a tool, other than derogation, at their disposal in
59 Soft law is often used to refer to non-biding official documents and texts of the European Commission 
such as White or Green Papers, Communications etc.
60 Schmidt, Burkard; Analysis. Communication, Directive or Code? The Commission’s Green Paper on 
Defence Procurement Has Opened a New Debate on How to Reach the Aim of an EDEM, ISS EU, Paris
2005
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questionable cases.61 The Commission was aware that the drafting of such a sensitive 
directive which should deal with offsets and security of supply would take several years. 
The establishment of the common rules for EDEM would be again delayed resting upon 
the political will of member states which had to be fully involved in the drafting process.
During the consultation procedure on the Green Paper several member states 
tabled a third option -  Code of Conduct. In March 2005, the recently established 
European Defence Agency received a mandate to summarize pros and cons o f the Code 
by the end of the year 2005 .62 A text of a primarily political nature would not be legally 
biding but it would be based on a voluntary decision of the member state to obey agreed 
principles which could be than reinforced. It should deal with the contracts falling within 
the remit of the Article 296. Therefore, the Code of Conduct should not be viewed as an 
alternative to other Commission actions but as a complement. EU companies would be 
allowed to compete for government contracts in defence field and if the national ministry 
of defence deviate from agreed principles it would have to explain its position in front of 
the EU counterparts.
The Commission had already published similar types of text on different issues -  
the Code of Conduct on Arms Export and it had proven to be a useful and effective tool 
in committing states to follow unified rules.
The EDA was charged with the Code’s administration. The Commissioner for 
external relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner pointed out that
61 For a thorough legal explanation see: Trybus, Martin; Procurement for the Armed Forces: Balancing 
Security and the Internal Market, European Law Review, Volume 27, Number 6, December 2002, pp. 692- 
713
62 Schmitt, Burkard; Defence Procurement in the European Union. The Current Debate, ISS EU, Paris 
2005, pp. 30
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“the current negotiations within the EDA on a Code o f  Conduct clearly showed the 
political will to put an end to a situation which was unanimously considered 
unsatisfactory”.63
While some experts believe that it will not have a success the others are 
convinced that the Code will have positive impacts due to the high-level political 
involvement in the EDA. Some authors argue that the Code will be successful if it applies 
to cooperative projects run by the EDA which are high-technology and high-value.64
The consultation on the Green Paper gathered 40 contributions from member 
states, industry representatives and institutes. The Commission made its assessment of 
the debate in the Communication from December 2005.65 The majority of respondents 
agreed with the Commission on the analysis describing current obstacles. Interpretative 
Communication and Defence Procurement Directive were seen as suitable instruments. 
Since the devil lies in detail, timing and conditions were varying characteristics. The 
contributors identified four key problematic areas:
• open tendering procedures based on the publication in the Official Journal of the
European Union were not compatible with confidentiality requirements;
63 Speech of the Commissioner for external relations B. Ferrero-Waldner, Plenary Session of the European 
Parliament, Strasbourg 16 November 2005
64 64 Schmidt, Burkard; Analysis. Communication, Directive or Code? The Commission’s Green Paper on 
Defence Procurement Has Opened a New Debate on How to Reach the Aim of an EDEM, ISS EU, Paris 
2005, pp. 5
65 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the results of the 
consultation launched by the Green Paper on Defence Procurement and on the future Commission 
initiatives, (2005) 626, Brussels, 6.12. 2005
42
• the use of a negotiated procedure were not properly defined;66
• the selection criteria were based solely on technical, economical and financial 
aspects, and key conditions for selecting tenders in the defence sector -  such as 
security of supply, confidentiality and urgency -  were missing;
• the rules on technical specifications, time limits and follow-up contracts 67
Only a few stakeholders rejected the idea of the Directive because of insufficient 
flexibility and the lengthy process of adoption. One of the biggest surprises was that the 
dividing line was not constituted by the difference between big and small states. The six 
largest arms-producing countries -  United Kingdom, France, Spain, Germany, Italy and 
Sweden were considered as “big” states. These European countries with a strong defence 
industrial base had traditionally favoured intergovernmental cooperation.68 Despite this 
fact, they agreed that defence market should be open up.
The Commission committed itself to prepare an Interpretative Communication in 
the course of the 2006. Secondly, it considered drafting of the Directive coordinating 
national procedures for the procurement of defence goods and services.
The Green Paper was widely discussed in the European Parliament. From the 
Wuermeling report, adopted in form of Resolution on 16 November 2005, it became
66 Negotiated procedure represents the situation where the contracting authorities, after a call for tender, 
consult and negotiate contact terms with selected companies.
67 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the results of the 
consultation launched by the Green Paper on Defence Procurement and on the future Commission 
initiatives, (2005) 626, Brussels, 6.12. 2005, pp. 5
68 For the analysis see: Bitzinger, R. A.; Towards a New Brave Industry?, The Adelphi Papers, Rutledge, 
London 2003
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crystal clear that the Parliament was supportive to the Commission’s proposals.69 It 
encouraged the Commission to go ahead with both an Interpretative Communication and 
a Directive on Defence Procurement. Deputies regarded
“a restrictive interpretation o f  national security interests as appropriate, given that 
Member States were already mutually dependent in areas such as monetary affairs or 
energy; wondered to what extent any meaningfiil distinction at all can still be drawn
9 70between national and common European security interests”.
A particular concern was raised as regards equal access to defence markets in 
Europe and the USA. Parliamentarians were convinced that the new EU defence 
procurement legislation should not be used as an instrument enabling US corporate 
interests to unilaterally infiltrate European defence procurement markets.
A big separate issue constituted collaborative projects of the EDA. There was a 
question whether to include these programs of the EDA into the remit of the proposed 
Defence Procurement Directive. The Commission seemed to be willing to do so but the 
hesitation of member states was foreseen. In any case, the Commission’s role as the 
watchdog of the Community law had already expanded to the areas of production and 
trade in armaments.71 Despite oral declarations, the establishment of the Agency
69 The report was the result of wide negotiations in the Internal Market Committee (IMCO), Security and 
Defence Sub-committee and Industry Committee. German Christian Democrat Joachim Wuermeling from 
IMCO was elected as a rapporteur.
70 Report of the European Parliament on the Green Paper on Defence Procurement, adopted by plenary in 
Strasbourg 16 November 2005, pp. 12
71 Georgopoulos, Aris; Defence Procurement and EU Law, European Law Review, Volume 30, Number 4, 
August 2005, pp. 568
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operating in the same field as the Commission could cause some competences frictions 
and overlaps in the future. Clear allocation of powers and roles is urgent.72
72 Ibid., pp. 569
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4. I n s t it u t io n a l iz e d  a r m a m e n t  c o o p e r a t io n
In order to understand problems of the institutionalized cooperation in armaments 
one had to explore the history which offers us a great opportunity to learn a lesson from it 
and avoid repetition of the same mistakes. This chapter will provide the reader with a 
closer look at the development o f armament activities at the transnational level beginning 
with the Independent European Programme Group in the late seventies up to the recent 
creation of the European Defence Agency.
Because of the fact that it has been merely an intergovernmental cooperation, we 
pay attention to views of European states which have been the major actors pushing or 
limiting any progress in the defence sector. A less important, however interesting role, 
has been played by European institutions -  the Western European Union and the 
European Union. A description and an analysis of the history of armaments cooperation 
should give us a broader context for the current debate about the EDA’s implications for 
the future of the armaments sector.
A r m a m e n t s  Gr o u p / O r g a n isa t io n
The Western European Armaments Group (WEAG) has traditionally been the 
most important forum for armaments cooperation in Europe. We can date its origins back 
to the 1976 when all NATO countries except Iceland established a new type of 
institutionalized cooperation -  the Independent European Programme Group (IEPG). The 
Declaration agreed by the WEU Ministers in Maastricht on 10 December 1991 developed 
the notion that the defence component of the European Union would be a suitable means 
to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and ensure better cooperation of 
European armaments programmes which could lead to consolidation of the European 
defence and equipment market.73 Observers and experts agreed that the JPEG had a 
limited impact. It lacked strong political support and therefore any driving force.74 IPEG 
and later on the WEAG meetings were held at the level of national armaments directors 
(NAD) every six years and at the level o f defence ministers annually. NADs should 
manage cooperation and decide on a basis of a shared consensus. A tiny secretariat based 
in Brussels looked after the daily business. The IPEG changed to the Western European 
Armaments Group and transferred its responsibilities and functions to the Western 
European Union in 1992.
The WEAG member states decided to fulfil four major objectives: more efficient 
use of resources through, inter alia, increased harmonization of requirements; the
73 WEU Maastricht Declaration 10 December 1991, http://www.weu.int/documents/911210en.pdf, 20 
April 2006
74 James, Andrew D.; European Armaments Cooperation -  Lessons for a Future European Armaments 
Agency, The International Spectator, Volume 38, Number 4, October-December 2003, pp. 63
4.1 T h e  f ir s t  a t t e m p  f o r  a r m a m e n t s  c o o p e r a t io n  -  W e s t e r n  E u r o p e a n
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opening up of national defence markets to cross-border competition; the strengthening of 
the European defence technological and industrial base; cooperation in research and 
development. These goals should be achieved via three working panels.
The first panel dealt with promotion of cost-effective cooperative equipment 
programmes which fulfilled the WEAG nations' military requirements and improved 
European defence industrial capability and competitiveness. Strengthening the European 
position in the defence research and technology was the mission o f the second panel. The 
EUCLID Program, involving industry and research institutes, had been the main 
instrument for pursuing the panel’s aim. Limits to the organization were especially due to 
scare financial resource at its disposal. The last panel focused on a common defence 
economics policy and armaments cooperation procedures.
Missing political will and unrealistic declarations meant that the WEAG could not 
evolve into the solid intergovernmental organization. On contrary, supporters of the 
WEAG appreciated equal treatment off all members and argued it was a unique way how 
to prevent arms-producing states from creating a cartel agreement and impose their 
interests on smaller countries.
Apart from political aspects there was an issue about the “juste retour” which 
caused disagreement among participating states. The principle should ensure that each 
country carries out work on a project in proportion to its government’s contribution to the 
common budget. This led to the support of rather ineffective corporations which would 
not be able to survive in the environment of the open market forces. Secondly, divergent 
national interests and technical procedures resulted in long delays and overruns.
We can find a first notice about an armament agency in the Maastricht Treaty 
which spoke that “proposals fo r  enhanced cooperation in the fie ld  o f  armaments with the 
aim o f  creating a European armaments agency”. After a very short period, when the 
WEAG was tasked to prepare provisions for the establishment of the European 
Armaments Agency (EAA), it became clear that major European powers would not be 
able to find agreement on aims and responsibilities of such an agency. The Ad Hoc Study 
Group was set up to review possibilities if there were convenient circumstances to the 
creation o f the EAA in 1993. However, the recommendations were negative member 
states decided to push further the development three years thereafter.
It was again a name change. Instead of the WEAG we could read about the 
Western European Armaments Organization (WEAO). But little had changed in reality. 
Only the research and technology part of the cooperation was a breakthrough while a 
permanent WEAO Research Cell could newly place contracts using its own legal 
personality and broader scope of executive powers. The Research Cell distributed over 
500 millions euros in 120 research and technology projects. It represented only 2.5 
percent of the European military R&T spending.75
The WEAO decided to publish a “masterplan” for the establishment of the EAA 
at the Erfurt ministerial meeting in 1997. A concrete timetable was accepted a year later 
and just a month before the Franco-British summit in St. Malo (see Chapter 2.3). In 
subsequent several years, a group of national experts defined the EAA’s functions, 
guiding principles, and its structure and organisation charter.
WEU Ministers of defence concluded in Rome meeting in spring 2002 that 
WEAG should be maintained as a forum for political consultations in the field of
75 Ibidem, pp. 71
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armaments in Europe and for the promotion of cooperation among member nations. The 
EAA should be established “as soon as all appropriate conditions were met and political 
consensus reached '16 It was de facto a statement of lacking political will to continue in 
an initiated work on the way towards the EAA. Governments showed no interest in the 
masterplan implementation.
As a new institutional option emerged the EU which could overcome the 
shortcomings of the former armaments cooperation formats. The WEAG meeting of 
NADs and the first head of the future European Defence Agency met in Dublin on 26 
February 2004. It was the start of the speedy process of power and functions transfer on 
the EDA. From many points of view incorporation of the WEAG/WEAO into the EDA 
became a reality. The last WEAG Ministers of Defence meeting took place in Brussels on 
22 November 2004. By the mid-2005 the WEAG/WEAO was dissolved both legally and 
politically. Ministers concluded:
“In view o f  the establishment o f  this European Defence Agency and the intention o f  the 
Agency to assimilate or incorporate relevant principles and practices o f  WEAG as 
appropriate, the Ministers recognized that European armaments co-operation in the 
future would take place within the European Union and that there is no longer a need fo r  
activities in the framework o f  the WEAG”11
The EU and its European Defence Agency slowly but gradually became the focal 
point for pan-European armaments cooperation. To avoid repeating the same mistakes
76 WEAG Rome Declaration, 16th May 2002, http://www.weu.int/weag/Rome_Declaration.pdf, 20 April
2006
77 The Ministers of Defence of the 19 WEAG Nations held their last meeting in Brussels on 22 November 
2004, http://www.weu.int/weag/, 20 April 2006
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legislators should bear in mind that the WEAGAVEAO format was never anything other 
than a consultation forum. Its weak powers and insufficient political backing were 
general reasons for lost opportunity. At the practical level, principal of “juste retour” 
could not lead to the establishment of effective (cost-saving and fast) collaboration of 
national armaments industries. Consensus-based decision-making pushed major arms- 
producers to set up a separate institutional arrangements which would allow a more 
flexible and exclusive framework. On the contrary, instead of simplification of structures 
the process resulted in duplication. As put it precisely Burkard Schmitt: “WEAG has 
addressed the right issues but has lacked the means and structures to find satisfactory 
solutions” 78
78 Schmitt, Burkard; The European Union and Armaments. Getting a Bigger Bang for Euro, Chaillot Papers 
63, ISS EU, Paris 2003, pp. 23
4 .2  2ND -  O r g a n is a t io n  f o r  J o i n t  A r m a m e n t s  C o o p e r a t io n
In the meantime, during the negotiations about the final design of the WEAO four 
European countries with the largest defence sectors decided to form a new institution -  
the Organisation for Joint Armaments Cooperation (better known under the French 
abbreviation OCCAR). Defence ministers of France, Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom signed the Administrative Arrangement in November 1996. After successful 
ratification in all founding countries, a formal treaty in a form of the OCCAR Convention 
entered into the force in January 2001. The core activity of the organization focused on 
management of common armaments projects in multinational teams.
The OCCAR set up five basic principles to be followed during the management 
period of any defence programme. These are: cost effectiveness, harmonisation of 
requirements and technology, competitive industrial base, renunciation of "juste retour" 
and openness to other countries willing to subscribe to the principles. Belgium and Spain 
joined the club via individual programmes in 2003 and 2005. The organization structure 
was the same as in the WEAO. There was a supervisory body composed of defence 
ministers and the daily run was governed by a group of National Armaments Directors.
Currently the OCCAR manages several projects including A400M, TIGER, 
BOXER, FSAF, COBRA and ROLAND. The A400M, involving also non-OCCAR 
members, was a project of significant importance. It should bridge the gap concerning 
strategic airlift o f European troops into remote areas. It could provide the ability to 
deploy troops within a theatre o f operations, either by parachute or by landing on short, 
semi-prepared landing strips. The aircraft could move such large items as helicopters and
certain outsized armoured or engineering equipment. Originally, the project was launched 
in the framework of the IPEG in 1984.
The current intention of the participating nations is to procure a total of 180 (after 
the withdrawal of Italy) aircrafts made up as follows: Germany 60, France 50, Spain 27, 
Turkey 10, UK 25, Belgium 7, and Luxembourg 1. Deliveries extend from end 2007 (first 
aircraft) to 2020. The value of the initial contract is €18 billion.
The rejection of the “juste retouť’ and replaced by a multi-year/multi-programme 
balance led to the more effective management allowing contracting authority to select 
suppliers according to the best offered quality/price ratio. However, the development 
phase of the strategic airlifter A400M has lasted over twenty years. Should the OCCAR 
become more than a management agency it needs to be tasked with more new projects in 
earlier stage of the procurement process. Even though some European politicians were 
considering a transmittal of the OCCAR under the EU umbrella, the small number of 
participating countries compared to the EU disabled such a solution.79
79 Keohane, Daniel; The EU and Armaments Cooperation, Centre for European Reform, London 2002, pp. 
26
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4 .3  L o l  F r a m e w o r k  A g r e e m e n t
The third option for defence collaboration evolved from the Letter of Intent (Lol) 
signed by defence ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the UK in July 
1998. It should ease defence sector restructuring in Europe. Two years later, a 
Framework Agreement was signed. It covered several areas of a common interest: 
security of supply, export procedures, security o f information, research and technology, 
treatment of technical information and harmonisation of military requirements.
Despite German and Italian slow down effects during the ratification period there 
were several quite innovative approaches which aimed at enhanced European cross- 
border cooperation and competition.80 In the area of security supplies Lol member states 
recognized that the security environment in the post-bipolar period was accompanied by 
trends towards greater international interdependence excluding full national autarky in 
armaments. The code of practice would bring higher level of transparency in ownership 
structures of defence companies. It would provide customers with better information and 
confidence. As regards exports, an objective of the Global Project Licence (GPL) was to 
grant certain programmes free movement of the system itself or its components within 
Lol countries without any restrictions. For the non-Lol markets a prior consensus had to 
be reached and special export permission issued.
Besides harmonisation of security clearance procedures harmonisation of military 
requirements appeared to be a field where member states whished to coordinate national
80 James, Andrew D.; European Armaments Cooperation -  Lessons for a Future European Armaments 
Agency, The International Spectator, Volume 38, Number 4, October-December 2003, pp. 66
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planning and established a data base which listed their capability needs. The needs would 
be than evaluated in order to find common solutions.
The Lol has not evolved into the permanent standing institution yet. Its Executive 
Committee meets four times a year at the level of sub-National Armaments Directors. 
This is a reason for limited success. The Lol does not have the capacity to set up a 
completely new regulatory framework. It has to rather harmonise current national rules 
and procedures. A comprehensive approach should be required.
Even though the Lol brought into the debate on the establishment of the European 
Armaments Agency new inputs and useful innovative methods it could never replace an 
idea itself. Institutional setting remains without the EAA a complicated patchwork with 
competences overlaps and missing the coherent armaments policy administered by a 
single institution with widely-shared political support.
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5 E u r o p e a n  d e f e n c e  a g e n c y  - e v o l u t io n
The first mention about the European armaments agency was in the founding
treaty of the European Defence Community. While it was originally a French proposal,
the ratification process was stopped by the French National Assembly in 1954 which
81declined even to vote on the Treaty, moving to other businesses on the agenda. 
European political circles were not sure if this new orientation of integration was 
correct.82 Half-a-century later, the idea of a pan-European supranational body acting in 
the defence sector field became a part of the reality. Re-opening of the debate on this 
issue was partly linked to two strategic documents which were drafted at the EU level 
and one bilateral declaration.
Despite the fact that the European Constitution has not been accepted by all 
member states yet, one of its recommendations, mentioned in the Javier Solana’s 
European Security Strategy, changed armaments cooperation.83 It paved the way for the 
establishment of the European armaments agency stating:
“Setting up a European Armaments and Strategic Research Agency to strengthen the 
industrial and technological base o f  the defence sector, allow member states to pursue 
different cooperation programmes among themselves and ensure fulfilment o f  
capabilities commitments... by promoting policy o f  harmonised procurement by the 
member states and to support research into defence technology. The Agency would
81 European Defence Community Treaty. Signed at Paris 27 May 1952, accessible via 
http://aei.pitt.edu/5201/01A)01669_l .pdf, 20 April 2006
82 Duke, Simon; The Elusive Quest for European Security. From EDC to CFSP, Palgrave, 2002, pp. 34-35
83 A Secure Europe in Better World. European Security Strategy, Brussels 12 December 2003, accessed via 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdfon 20 April 2006
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incorporate, with a European label, closer forms o f  cooperation which already exist in 
the armaments field  between certain Member States (OCCAR, LoI).”M
The text was drafted by Michel Bamier at the fall of 2002. Barnier served as a 
European Commissioner for regional policy in the Prodi Commission and chaired 
Working Group on Defence in the European Convention which was a broad political 
forum for discussion on future of the European integration. The Working Group on 
Defence shed some light on armaments matters as well.
Subsequently, in within two-months, a Franco-British summit took place at Le 
Touquet. After St Malo (ESDP evolution), it was a second bilateral initiative of Blair and 
Chirac aimed at boosting a debate on European defence. This time it was not a Franco- 
German engine that brought into the debate a new trend. Both “Channel politicians” 
jointly proposed the creation of a defence agency which ought to take care of European 
military capabilities defined in the European Headline Goal.
There was a question of what stood behind the London’s and Paris’s decision to 
step further in the armaments field when there had been a number o f unsuccessful ad hoc 
projects trying to pursuit the same objectives (NATO or WEAG examples). Britain left 
aside an old fear about a “Fortress Europe” excluding American suppliers from the 
European market. Blair understood that the EU was a much wider political framework 
affecting many other policy areas such as industry, competition or regional development. 
On the other hand, Chirac favoured independent European activities in defence sector 
balancing the strength of the USA military-industry complex. Both partners were also 
convinced that the armaments agency could play a major role in a political review and an
84 Final report of working group 8 on Defence: CONV461/CI2 dated 16 December 2002, pp.2 and 22
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assessment of the European military capabilities development process and in some 
ongoing defence projects (Eurofighter).
How to make from the bilateral summit the EU institution? France and the United 
Kingdom represented two out of six largest arms-producing countries which accounted 
for more than 90 percent of defence equipment production in the EU. Some of the 
producers actually hoped that the agency could preserve their ineffective national defence 
industrial bases tanks to “buy European” logic. The remaining EU member states were 
condemned for to be in a position of mere consumers. These states had to be persuaded 
that the proposed agency did not serve to meet interests of big powers. In such a case, it 
would never push competition among companies at both sides of Atlantic and would
85never reduce prices of the equipment.
As said before, the Agency happened to be part of the wider consideration on 
future of Europe. In June 2003, the European Council of Thessalonica consecrated the 
Council bodies to carry out works on the concept of the Agency’s establishment.86 A 
bilateral initiative was transferred to the catch-all declaration. European heads of states 
and governments committed themselves to set up an Agency, under the Council’s 
authority in the course of 2004. An ad hoc preparation group reorganised into the Agency 
Establishment Team delivered its work on the mission statement, legal, financial and 
administrative provisions. The Council’s experts concluded that in place of fragmentation 
in defence matters, caused by partial inputs of various institutions, the EDA’s 
comparative advantage should be its ability to comprehend all related agendas, so as to
85 Keohane, Daniel; Europe’s New Defence Agency, Centre for European Reform, London 2004, pp. 1
86 Presidency Conclusions -  Thessalonica, 19 and 20 June 2003, accessible via: 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/76279.pdf, pp. 20,20 April 2006
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realise its synergies.87 These findings served DG RELEX and COREPER as a basis for
88drafting the legal act.
The second document giving the Union strategic assessment of the security 
environment - The European Security Strategy referred to the Agency saying that 
“progressive framing o f  a common defence policy will be supported by, as Member States
89consider appropriate, cooperation between them in the fie ld  o f  armaments”.
The decision to create the European Defence Agency was adopted in the General 
Affairs and External Relations Council. The Joint Action of 12 July 2004 was a landmark 
decision. Some authors believed that the new agency could have the potential to apply a 
major impact on EU defence policy via cooperation in purchasing and development of 
military equipment for common European military forces90 The Agency staff was 
progressively being built up from initial number of 22 (2004) to the total of 80 personnel 
in 2005. The Agency was composed of fixed-term officials hired directly by the EDA and 
seconded national experts which ought to grant it an intergovernmental perspective.
87 EU Security and Defence: core documents 2004, Vol. V, Chaillot Papers 75, ISS EU, Paris 2005, pp. 52
88 RELEX -  Directorate General for External Relations part of the European Commission; COREPER -  
Comité des representante permanents is a standing Council’s body composed of heads of missions to the 
EU.
89 Article 17, A Secure Europe in a Better World, European Security Strategy, Brussels 12 December 2003
90 Keohane, Daniel; Europe’s New Defence Agency, Centre for European Reform, London 2004, pp.2
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5.1 E u r o p e a n  d e f e n c e  a g e n c y  -  p o w e r s  a n d  o r g a n s
In order to avoid mistakes known from previous cooperation formats, the EDA 
needed a strong political guidance and senior officials in the top management posts 
assisted by national governments. Germany and Italy argued for an agency with 
minimum powers and wished to see formal and regular meetings of defence ministers in 
the Council of the EU. Defence ministers could ensure a strict policy control as a part of 
the EDA review. “It w on’t achieve anything that defence ministers do n ’t wont to see 
achieved’ voiced out Nick Witney a new Chief Executive of the EDA.91
On contrary, Paris preferred a fully-fledged armaments agency defining common 
armaments strategies. Standing in-between, Britain advocated latter approach being 
afraid that the National Armaments Directors would not secure a sufficient level of 
political control. Second reason was to emphasise industrial and market views in defence 
sector which outweigh the French approach. The French government, having long-term 
and strong strategic interests in the defence industry, always supported a higher degree of 
state involvement in national armaments companies.92 These symbolic and theoretical 
differences had concrete repercussions in terms of the suitable candidates for the Chief 
Executive post in the new Agency.
At the end a compromise was reached, Javier Solana was entrusted to head the 
Agency and British official Nick Witney, former Director-General for International 
Security Policy at the UK Ministry o f Defence, was appointed the Chief Executive for 
three years by the Steering Board.
91 Europe’s Defence Agency on the starting blocks in: European Voice, 22-28 July 2004, pp. 3
92 For more on French military-industry complex see: Maulny, Jean-Pierre (ed.); Industrial and Strategic 
Cooperation Models for Armaments Companies in Europe, IRIS, 2004, pp. 82-94
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Solana’s task was to ensure that the guidelines issued by the Council and 
decisions made by the Steering Board (SB) such as a work programme or the budget 
framework were implemented by the Chief Executive who should report to the Council 
twice a year. In harmony with the directives of the SB, the Chief Executive was 
responsible for negotiations with third countries and organisations.
Because of the feet that the EDA did not have its own procurement and research 
budgets to buy or manage multinational armaments programmes it had to establish good 
working relations with other bodies within the EU framework (Council, Commission), 
Capabilities Development Mechanism (CDM) operated by the NATO and other 
organisations.93 Defence ministers approved the EDA’s budget for less than €2 million in 
2004 and €25 million for 2005.94
The OCCAR was seen as a first option to manage cooperative programmes 
arising in the Agency. Future incorporation of the OCCAR under the EDA umbrella was 
a considered option. An early objective was the assimilation of the Lol’s harmonisation 
of defence equipment and research activities. As the WEAG/WEAO was about to 
terminate its existence, member states agreed to transfer I and III Panel responsibilities 
under the Agency remit. Non-EU states and partners should not come across any 
obstacles participating in individual projects.
As Denmark had an opt-out from the Treaties on defence related matters, it did 
not participate in the EDA. Its main decision-making body was therefore composed of 24 
national defence ministers and the Head of the Agency. The SB meets twice a year.
93 N. Witney predicted that it could be ten years efore the Agency was carrying out major procurment 
projects on behalf of some or all EU states. Europe’s Defence Agency on the starting blocks in: European 
Voice, 22-28 July 2004, pp. 3
94http://www.eda.europa.eu/procurement/Consolidated%20Version_EDA%20Financial%20Provisions_%2 
0Amended%2016-12-05.pdf, accessed 20 April 2006
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Meetings are convened and chaired by Solana and attended by the Chief Executive and 
the Chairman of the EU Military Committee and the National Armaments Director of the 
EU Presidency. In praxis, the Commission is usually represented by the Commissioner 
for Enterprise and Industry Günter Verheugen. According to the debated agenda, the SB 
more often meets at the level of NADs, National Defence Research Directors, National 
Defence Planners or Policy Directors. It may decide to invite the NATO Secretary 
General or the third party representative if it is in the pursuit of a common interest. But 
only representatives of member states take part in decision-making which is carried out 
by the qualified majority.
Daily business of the EDA is run by the Management Board which includes the 
Chief Executive, his deputy and five directors (Capabilities, Research and Technology, 
Armaments Industry and Market and Corporate Services). It is hard to believe that it has 
happened by accident that out of eight key positions in the EDA Management Board, six 
posts were occupied by officials coming from arms-producing countries. It is likely that 
the next Chief Executive would have to come from either a small member state or from 
those newly joined Eastern European countries.
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5.2  E u r o p e a n  d e f e n c e  a g e n c y  -  m is s io n  a n d  p r o je c t s
The agency was ascribed four major functions and roles including: defence 
capabilities development; armaments cooperation; the European defence, technological 
and industrial base and defence equipment market and research and technology. It was 
designed to define capability needs o f ESDP/Headline Goal 2010 and to force member 
states to coordinate planning of defence purchasing.
In comparison with the single Joint Strike Fighter project developed by the USA, 
inside the EU, there have been ongoing three jet programmes: Eurofighter (collaboration 
of Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK), French Rafale and Swedish-British Gripen. But 
individual European states cannot afford to purchase or develop all imaginable weaponry 
they could need. The resources are limited. The EDA should encourage EU countries to 
match their procurement needs and come up with common solutions.
Besides defence market and research issues there is a key role to be played by the 
EDA in armaments sector. How best to contribute to the increasingly urgent 
improvement of both the quantity and quality of individual national armies in the EU? In 
order to address these questions it has to tackle older cooperative programmes, identify 
its shortcomings and benefits and propose new collaborative projects. Ideally, 
collaboration starts with a common understanding of capability needs followed by 
priorities projection into the joint equipment or system development phase.
There are other examples of the shared capability need such as a long-distance 
transport plane (the EU has at disposal only four aircrafts of this type in comparison with
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200 of these in the USA).95 The EU summit in Hampton Court decided to look deeper 
into the road map of the Armoured Fighting Vehicle, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
programme and lately Command, Control and Communications (C3) development.96 
Primarily, attention of the Agency should focus on the four strategic priorities which can 
assist the EU member states to face adequately threats and challenges of the 21 century.
Unlike the ECAP, the EDA favoured to top-down approach, driving coordination 
and exercising immanent pressure on member state to enhance their military capability 
improvements. The EDA should help to eliminate waste and unnecessary duplication of 
defence budgets and replace it by pooling of efforts and market consolidation. The Head 
of the Agency will have to convince its members to complete defence market re­
construction. This is a very sensitive issue for governments as it requires discharging 
employees. Given the fact that European politicians are worried about the current high 
level of job losses they will certainly pay a special attention to changes in defence 
industry sector with any labour implications.
95 Keohane, Daniel; Europe’s New Defence Agency, Centre for European Reform, London 2004, pp. 2
96 Informal meeting of Head of States and Governments in Hampton Court on 27 October 2005
http ://www. eu2005. gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid= 1107 
293391098&a=KArticle&aid=l 119527321606
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5.3 E u r o p e a n  d e f e n c e  a g e n c y  -  f u t u r e  im p l ic a t io n s
Even though the EDA has a short track record, the Agency achieved in certain 
areas a success while in other spheres it still waits for an impetus. Some experts predicted 
that the EDA could become fully operational and effective only in long-term perspective, 
which is in 5-10 years.97 In current transition years many improvements have to be 
achieved if not to repeat old mistakes in the armaments cooperation sector.
It is hardly possible to imagine that Javier Solana could dedicate his time only to 
the armaments portfolio being the High Representative and Secretary General at the same 
time. Some advised the appointment of a new deputy Secretary General of the Council 
responsible for armaments. It has to be a respected political figure that would look after 
the sector’s development thoroughly.98 It is also worth noting that the political priority 
has been already given to the subject by the fact Verheugen, as a vice-president of the 
Commission, is a standing member of the EDA’s Steering Board.
Recently, the Steering Board approved a voluntary Code of Conduct on Defence 
Procurement on 21 November 2005. It will come into effect on 1 July 2006 in those 
member states which decide to subscribe to it. Member states committed themselves to 
inject more transparency and competition into the procurement practices which have 
greatly influenced armaments market fragmentation. The Code covers all contracts 
exceeding €1 million. The majority of tender contracts were exempted from the single 
European market applying Article 296.
97 Flournoy, Michele A. and Smith, Julianne; European Defence Integration: Bridging the Gap between 
Strategy and Capabilities, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington 2005,56-57
98 Keohane, Daniel; Europe’s New Defence Agency, Centre for European Reform, London 2004, pp. 6
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The new intergovernmental regime forces participating states to announce all 
relevant defence procurement opportunities through a single online portal setting 
objective criteria for selecting bidders (Electronic Bulletin Board) and operated by the 
EDA. Only Hungary and Spain (Denmark is not involved in any of EDA’s activities) 
exercised their option not to join the Code. However, both have indicated the possibility 
of doing so later.
The regime will embody certain classes of exception for procurement of research 
and technology; collaborative procurements; and procurements of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear propulsion systems, chemical, bacteriological and radiological goods and 
services, and cryptographic equipment. When exceptions are invoked or when other 
irregular events occur, participating member states will wish to have an explanation - and 
the opportunity, if  need be, to debate the circumstances in the Agency Steering Board. 
These procedures combined with the support of small and medium enterprises via the 
Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain reinforce mutual confidence a thus usefulness 
of the Code itself."
99 The Code of Best Practice in the Supply Chain, Brussels 27 April 2006; accessed via 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/reference/eda/EDA%20%20Code%20of%20Best%20Practice%20in%20the%20 
Supply%20Chain%20-%20European%20Defence%20Equipment%20Market.pdf, 27 April 2006
6. C o n c l u s io n
We have entered the 21st century. New threats and challenges of globalization in 
the defence and economic field, as well as national policy restraints set a new impetus for 
the cooperation within the Europe-wide framework. How to deliver national policy 
programmes to important domestic constituencies under the circumstances of falling 
defence budgets and the American firms competing on the global market?
Politicians in sovereign member states grasped that the best answer to the 
question lays in international bargains management. What is more, the processes of 
intergovernmental bargaining at the European level also strengthen states vis-á-vis their 
home policies. Traditional forms of bilateral interstate cooperation had an air of 
obsolescence in the post-bipolar environment.100
With independent military and technical resources Europeans are more likely to 
diverge from the US government. One single representative case could be arms embargo 
imposed on China after Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. Recently, export embargo 
was partly damaged by several EU countries exporting military equipment worth more 
than 340 million Euros to China in 2004 despite the continuation of the sanction 
regime.101 The embargo does not apply to military components and dual-use items. These 
goods, which sensitive technologies were developed by the US companies or purchased 
by the US government, were sold to Peking. Transatlantic partnership and mutual 
confidence was therefore endangered.
100 Rosamond, Ben; Theories of European Integration, MacMillan, London 2000, pp. 139
101 Cronin, David; EU military export to China continue despite arms embargo in European Voice, Vol. 11, 
No. 40; 8 December 2006
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Besides market-oriented issues, the evolution of the ESDP and precisely the 
Battle Group Concept 2007 was internal European and second major factor which stood 
behind the decision of heads of states and governments to create the European Defence 
Agency. The EU governments declared their will to go step by step towards synchronized 
development of military capabilities under the EU heading leaving traditional concept of 
military industry autarky aside.
The EDA was tasked with defence market consolidation and to bridge European 
military capabilities gap. The EU has its soldiers (via national contributions) but it lacks 
military equipment designed to combat new threats and challenges.
“ Yes, the Agency has important fimctions related to, fo r  example, the defence industry. 
But our leading light, the star we steer by, is the aim o f  building Europe ’s military 
capacity -  or, i f  you will, o f  trying to ensure that Europe gets a better output from what it 
spends on defence.”102
In contrast to previous collaborative projects WEAG/WEAO, OCCAR or WEU, 
the new Agency seems to be better designed to deal with national administrations which 
have been traditionally reluctant about any defence topic transfers to Brussels. 
Intergovernmental nature of the EDA offers to defence ministers a formal forum for 
discussions on armaments. For the first time in history ministers of defence have been 
meeting on a regular and formal basis in the EDA Steering Board. It provides greater 
political leadership in armaments efforts especially in the European Capability Action
102 Witney, Nick; The European Defence Agency -  Strategic Directions and Impact on Transatlantic 
Relations; Press Club; Washington 24 October 2005; accessed via http://www.eda.europa.eu/news/2005- 
10-24-0.htm; 20 April 2006
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Plan review and assessment. Some authors speak about the inevitable need to establish 
“Mr ESDP” function run by a senior political person.103
It is crystal clear from many opinion polls that European citizens want the EU to 
become an active and powerful global actor. European public opinion is still very 
receptive to issues relating to the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). At 
77%, support for a common security and defence policy remains at the same high level 
obtained in 2005. The intensity of this support is even stronger in the ten new Member 
States: there is a difference of 10 points between the average obtained in the fifteen old 
Member States and that recorded in the ten new Member States (75%).104
Missing methods o f open scrutiny in the European Security and Defence Policy, 
constantly criticised by the European Parliament, explains a pan-European feeling of 
democratic deficit. In the long term view, public credibility of EU external actions could 
be severely damaged. The EU in cooperation with the Capitals needs to find a proper 
balance between their security interests and their citizens being able to control 
development of the ESDP and armaments collaboration.
One should not underestimate the theme of disarmament. The EU is very active in 
non-proliferation and disarmament of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The legitimate 
question therefore is: “Shell we pool national resources in defence armament cooperation 
or rather prohibit the EU from being a major arms producer?” The EU officials cannot 
respond to it. It is up to the decision o f individual member states to declare their interests 
in these two opposing policies.
103 Keohane, Daniel; The EU and Armaments Cooperation, Centre for European Reform, London 2002, 
pp. 34
104 Eurobarometer 6 4 ,12/2005, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_first_en.pdf 20 
April 2006
69
The Code of Conduct on Defence Procurement, increased budget for security 
research and technology and support of the EDA’s pilot projects (on-line tender 
publication) indicate enhanced interest of national executives in armaments cooperation 
at the European level. However, there are few obstacles related to coordination of 
defence need. The text of the European Security Strategy is without any doubt a highly 
professional peace of document. Unfortunately, it is not mirrored in national security or 
military strategies which are crucial for any defence ministry planning. It states which 
goals are to be achieved in mid-term perspective. It is exactly room where combined 
effort can make a difference. It also orientates the way the authorities view current and 
future security environment. Without harmonisation of formal military strategies a 
common armaments policy cannot be effective.
I would like to conclude:
“We are trying to climb the same mountain and we are all roped together.”105
The author believes that this paper could be a practical and comprehensive 
material analysing armaments sector in the European Union. Its solid theoretical grounds 
combined with unique literature and info sources covered, hopefully, provide even an 
expert reader with original and enriching insight into the complex subject.
105 Witney, Nick; Role of Different Actors: Industry, National Governments, European Commission, 
European Defence Agency; Economist Konference, Paris 29 November 2005; accessed via 
http://www.eda.europa.eu/news/2005-l l-29-0.htm; 20 April 2006
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Předkládaná práce se snaží o analýzu zbrojní spolupráce realizované jednak mezi 
členskými státy Evropské unie tak i na komunitámí úrovni. Autor čerpal z anglicky psané 
literatury sestávající se z literatury primární (oficiální dokumenty, smlouvy, novinový 
archiv European Voice) a sekundární (zejména publikační řada Chillot Papers ISS EU) 
včetně množství článků z odborných periodik. V neposlední řadě měl autor možnost 
vstřebat množství praktických poznatků během stáže u Evropské komise v Bruselu. 
V teoretické rovině se práce opírá o aplikovanou mnoho-úrovňovou analýzu Evropské 
integrace dle B. Buzana a tématické dělení aktivit EU dle U.Mörth. Převládající 
perspektivou na mezinárodně-politické dění je  liberální mezivládní přístup. Časová linie 
je  vztažena na období 90. let a první dekády 21. století.
Jedině na základě geostratické proměny bezpečnostního prostředí v Evropě po 
skončení bipolámího konfliktu a důsledků globalizace světových trhů je možné pochopit 
proč se znovu obnovila diskuse o zbrojní spolupráci v Evropě. Společná bezpečnostní a 
obranná politika, odstraňování zbývajících bariér na vnitřním trhu EU a dramatická 
restrukturalizace zbrojního průmyslu spojená s novou úlohou státu ve zbrojním sektoru 
předznamenaly nutnost zvýšené kooperace na mezinárodním poli. Několik dřívějších 
pokusů o takovouto spolupráci dosáhlo pouze omezených úspěchů. Nedávný vznik 
Evropské obranné agentury však může, díky vysokému politickému interesu 
zúčastněných aktérů, znamenat zásadní obrat v chápání tradiční role státu ve zbrojním 
sektoru.
8. R e s u m e
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